Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set by Dreher, A. et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set
Dreher, A.; Sturm, J.E.; de Haan, J.
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2007
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Dreher, A., Sturm, J. E., & de Haan, J. (2007). Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job?
Evidence based on a new data set. (CESifo Working Papers; Vol. 2045). Munich: CESifo.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the












DOES HIGH INFLATION CAUSE CENTRAL 
BANKERS TO LOSE THEIR JOB? 





JAKOB DE HAAN 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2045 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 
• from the CESifo website:           Twww.CESifo-group.deT 




DOES HIGH INFLATION CAUSE CENTRAL 
BANKERS TO LOSE THEIR JOB? 





This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 
countries for 1970-2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank 
governor is replaced in a particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office 
elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter 
result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of 
central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which 
TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account. 
JEL Code: E5. 
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In this paper we examine which political and economic factors affect the likelihood that 
a central bank governor will be replaced. We present new data on the term in office of 
central bank governors for 137 countries covering the period 1970-2004, thereby 
substantially extending previous datasets, both regarding the number of countries and 
the number of years covered.1 We estimate conditional Logit models of the 
probability that the central bank governor will be replaced. Our results show that the 
share of the current term in office elapsed, high levels of political and regime instability, 
the occurrence of elections, and inflation increase the probability of a turnover. 
Our main contribution is that we criticize the use of the so-called turnover rate 
of central bank governors (TOR) as an indicator of central bank independence (CBI).2 
To examine whether there is any relationship between CBI and inflation, one needs an 
indicator measuring the extent to which the monetary authorities are independent 
from politicians. Most empirical studies use an indicator based on central bank laws in 
place. However, legal measures of CBI may not reflect the true relationship between 
the central bank and the government (Forder, 1996 and Mangano, 1998). Especially in 
countries where the rule of law is less strongly embedded in the political culture, there 
can be wide gaps between the formal, legal institutional arrangements and their 
practical impact (Walsh, 2005). This is particularly likely in many developing 
economies. Cukierman (1992) argues that the TOR may therefore be a better proxy for 
CBI in these countries than measures based on central bank laws. The TOR is based on 
the presumption that, at least above some threshold, a higher turnover of central bank 
governors indicates a lower level of independence. Various studies report that 
countries that experienced rapid turnover among their central bank heads also tended 
to experience high rates of inflation (see, for instance, Cukierman, 1992). This is a 
case, however, in which causality is difficult to evaluate; is inflation high because of 
political interference that leads to rapid turnover of central bank officials? Or are 
central bank officials tossed out because they can’t keep inflation down? (Walsh, 
2005). In the latter case, the TOR is a poor indicator of CBI.3  
                                                 
1 The datasets of Cukierman (1992) and De Haan and Kooi (2000) are the most widely used previous 
datasets. 
2 See Berger et al. (2001) for a survey of the literature on central bank independence. 
3 A few studies have sounded a warning that conclusions on the relationship between inflation and the 
TOR are highly sensitive to influential observations. De Haan and Kooi (2000) and Sturm and De Haan 
(2001) report that the TOR indicator only becomes significant if high inflation countries are added to the 
sample. This suggests that causality may run from inflation to turnovers rather than the other way round. 
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 Our empirical results suggest that using the TOR as a proxy for CBI is 
problematic when it comes to measuring the impact of central bank independence on 
inflation. Since inflation increases the likelihood that the central bank governor will 
be replaced, turnovers are endogenous to inflation. This is confirmed in models for 
cross-section inflation differentials in which the TOR becomes insignificant once its 
endogeneity is taken into account. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our data 
and section 3 discusses the methodology used. Section 4 presents our estimation results 
for the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced, while section 5 contains 
the models for cross-section inflation. The final section offers some concluding 
comments. 
 
2. Data  
The database contains information on the term in office of the central bank governor 
for 137 countries covering the period 1970-2004. Most information was received 
directly from central banks. Some central banks provide data on previous governors 
on their homepage, while for many other central banks we got the information by 
writing emails and letters. A second source is Morgan Stanley Dean Witter’s Central 
Bank Directory. Our data cover all geographic regions fairly well. While we tried to 
get data going back as far as 1970, we did not always succeed either because data 
were not available for the entire period or because countries came into existence after 
1970. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the countries and periods for which we have 
information, as well as the number of times the central bank governor was replaced 
during those periods and the average TOR. 
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 Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of the number of governor changes 
during the time period for which we have information, while Figure 2 presents the 
average TOR for the countries in our sample. According to our dataset, on average a 
central bank governor remained in office for 3.6 years. On average, a turnover occurred 
in 22 percent of the country-years. Argentina (with an average TOR of 0.86) and 
Ecuador (average 0.80) have the highest turnover rates of the countries in our sample.  
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Figure 3 shows the yearly average turnover for our full sample. It is interesting that 
after 1995, when many countries increased the legal independence of their central bank, 
the average number of turnovers decreases.4 Figure 4 shows the average turnover for 
various regions, using the World Bank classification of regions. It becomes clear that 
there is quite some variation across regions. For instance, in Latin-America and Sub-
Saharan Africa the turnover decreases at the end of the sample period, but there is no 
clear trend in some of the other regions, like Europe and Central Asia. 
 
                                                 
4 This result is not driven by the increasing number of countries in our sample in more recent years. 
When restricting the sample to countries with at least 30 observations, the overall picture looks very 
much alike. 
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Our dataset also includes information on the legal term in office of the central bank 
governor. Unfortunately, data is not available for all country-years in our sample. We 
obtained data on regular office terms for 91 countries, for an average of 31 years, 
ranging from 8-36. In some cases the governor’s term in office is unlimited, and the 
most likely reason for a turnover is retirement due to age.  
 
3. Methodology 
According to Cukierman (1992), high and sustained inflation leads to the evolution of 
automatic or semi-automatic accommodative mechanisms, like indexation of contracts 
in the labour and capital markets, that may undermine central bank independence. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that a high inflation rate may cause the replacement of 
the central bank governor due to dissatisfaction with this policy outcome (Walsh, 2005). 
Both arguments, although fundamentally different in their reasoning, lead to the 
hypothesis that the higher the rate of inflation the shorter the term in office of the 
governor will be. We test this hypothesis using our new dataset. 
 We first estimate a model for the likelihood that a central bank governor is 
being replaced. Our dependent variable is binary, and takes the value one if the central 
bank governor was replaced in a particular year and country. We estimate our model 
employing conditional fixed effects Logit. In case of binary choice variables with panel 












     (1) 
 
where: itiitit xy ναβ ++= '* . This function can be interpreted as the inclination of the 
government to replace the central bank governor, which is dependent on observed 
variables (x), unobserved individual (country) characteristics (α) and a random error 
term (ν). The probability that we observe a replacement is: 
 
)'()'()0()1( * iitiitititit xFxPyPyP αβαβν +=−−>=>== .   (2) 
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In a fixed effects context, the number of parameters increases with the number of 
countries. This is known as the incidental parameters problem. Chamberlain (1980) 
shows that it is impossible to estimate the parameters of this binary choice model 
consistently and he therefore proposes a method to circumvent this problem, i.e. 
conditional Logit estimation. The idea of this approach is to condition the likelihood 







is such a minimum sufficient statistic. The conditional likelihood function can 
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The probability of the observed replacement of the central bank governor (by 
construction) no longer depends on the fixed effects and hence the coefficients of the 
variables of interest can be estimated consistently. In essence, the conditional fixed 
effects Logit estimator compares all observations within a given country when there is 
a replacement of the central bank governor with all the observations when there is no 
such change.5  
 Since some of the data are not available for all country-years, the panel data are 
unbalanced. All explanatory economic variables are lagged by one year to avoid 
simultaneity. The explanatory variable of prime interest, i.e. the inflation rate p, is 
transformed by the formula (p/100)/(1+(p/100)= π) to reduce the influence of extreme 
observations. The estimated model is: 
 
tiitittiti uXshelapgovchange ,1,3121,1, +++++= −−− ηβπββα , (4) 
 
where govchange is one in year t when at least one change of the central bank governor 
occurred in that year; shelap is the share of the governor’s legal term in office elapsed, 
and X is a vector of control variables. ηi are the country dummies and uit is an i.i.d. 
disturbance.  
                                                 
5 There is one obvious drawback in employing the conditional fixed effects Logit model: we cannot 
include explanatory variables that do not vary over time. 
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 We include the share of the governors’ term in office as stipulated by the 
central bank law that has elapsed. For instance, if the legal term in office is 8 years, 
and the governor has been in office for 4 years this variable is 0.5. However, in case 
of an indefinite or unknown term in office it is not obvious how to construct this 
variable. In those cases we presume that the maximum legal term in office is 8 years.6  
 To determine which control variables should be taken up, we have screened 
the literature to come up with a long list of potential control variables.7 The variables 
are listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. We apply a general to specific approach to 
come up with our base model. Finally, we employ the so-called Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (EBA) to examine the robustness of our findings. This approach can be 
explained as follows. We estimate equations of the following general form: 
 
 govchangei,t= αMi,t + βFi,t + γZi,t + ui,t ,  (5) 
 
where M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F is the variable of interest (in 
our case: recent inflation); Z is a vector of up to three (here we follow Levine and 
Renelt, 1992) possible additional explanatory variables, which according to the 
literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term. We use the 
CDF(0) test suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997), which is based on the fraction of the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates 
the larger of the areas under the density function either above or below zero; in other 
words, regardless of whether this is CDF(0) or 1-CDF(0). So CDF(0) will always be a 
number between 0.5 and 1.0. Following Sala-i-Martin, a variable is considered to be 
robust if the CDF(0) test statistic > 0.90.8 
                                                 
6 We have also experimented with two alternatives. First, we assumed the term in office for countries 
with indefinite or unknown term in office to be equal to the average time in office in our sample, i.e. 
3.6 years. Second, we took the average of those countries that have specified the term in office of the 
CB governor in their central bank law (5 years). It turned out that our main results are very similar 
under both alternatives (results available on request). 
7 Those few studies that explicitly estimate models explaining cross-country variation in CBI suggest 
various control variables. A good example is Stasavage and Keefer (2003) who argue that political 
replacement of a central bank governor is more likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; 
to take this argument into account we employ Henisz’s (2000) data on political constraints. Frankel 
(2005) reports that in the year following a currency crash the finance minister or central bank governor 
– whoever held the office of the country’s governor of the IMF – often lost his job. To take this 
argument into account, we employ a dummy variable reflecting the occurrence of a currency crisis. A 
very detailed motivation and description of the control variables is provided in Dreher et al. (2007). 
8 Recently, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) proposed a so-called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates 
(BACE) approach to check the robustness of different explanatory variables in growth regressions. This 
approach builds upon the procedure suggested by Sala-i-Martin (1997) in the sense that different 
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 In the final part of our analysis we estimate panel and cross-section models for 
inflation using a model similar to that of Campillo and Miron (1997). The models are 
first estimated by OLS, assuming that the TOR is exogenous. Next, we take the 
endogeneity of the TOR into account, using the results of our conditional fixed effects 
Logit model for the likelihood that a central bank governor is being replaced. 
  
4. Results for the logit model 
Table 1 shows the estimation results for equation (4). The specification is chosen on 
the basis of a general to specific approach applied to various possible control 
variables – shown in Table A2 of the Appendix – that all have been suggested to 
affect the term in office of central bank governors (see Dreher et al. 2007 for an 
extensive discussion). The estimation results suggest that five variables are significant 
determinants of the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced: the share 
of the legal term in office that has elapsed, the share of political veto players who 
drop, a post-election variable measuring the part of a year which is within 12 months 
after an election, a dummy for coups d’etats, and – most important for our analysis – 
(lagged) inflation. 
 Past inflation increases the probability that the central bank governor will be 
replaced at the five percent level of significance. According to the marginal effect, a 




                                                                                                                                            
specifications are estimated (by OLS) to check the sensitivity of the coefficient estimate of the variable 
of interest. The biggest disadvantages of the BACE approach are the need of having a balanced data 
set, i.e. an equal number of observations for all regressions (due to the chosen weighting scheme) and  
the restriction of limiting the list of potential variables to be less than the number of observations. 
 11
Table 1. The impact of  inflation on the likelihood  
that a central bank governor will be replaced 
(1)
Share of term elapsed 0.825
(7.97***)
Percentage of veto players 0.340









Prob > Chi2 0.00
Number of countries 119
Number of observations 2339  
 
 
Table 2 shows the outcome of the EBA. We have employed two specifications for the 
M-vector. In the restricted model, only the share of the legal term if office that has 
elapsed is included in the M-vector, while the remaining variables listed in Table A2 
in the Appendix are included in the Z-vector. In the full model, all variables arising 
from the general-to-specific approach as shown in Table 1 are taken up in the M 
vector, while the remaining variables are in the Z-vector. As can be seen, according to 
both specifications, the CDF(0) test indicates that inflation is robustly related to the 
likelihood that the central bank governor will be replaced. 
 
 
Table 2. Is past inflation robustly related to the likelihood that CB governor is being 
replaced? 
 CDF(0) 
Restricted model 0.96 
Full model 0.91 
 
 
Now that we have shown that inflation has a robust impact on the likelihood that a 
central bank governor will be replaced, we will examine in the next section the 
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implications of this finding for models explaining cross-country inflation differentials 
using the TOR as a procy for CBI. 
 
5. Inflation models 
In this section we report panel and cross-section models for inflation. The dependent 
variable is our transformed inflation variable. Following Campillo and Miron (1997), 
we include the following explanatory variables:  
• An indicator for openness (OPEN, defined as sum of export and import in 
relation to GDP) over the period under consideration (taken from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators). 
• The log of the level of GDP per capita (GDPCAP) at the beginning of the 
period (again from the World Development Indicators). 
• A proxy for political instability (PI), measured by the first principal 
component of the number of assassinations, strikes, guerrilla warfare, major 
crises, riots, and revolutions in a particular country and year taken from the 
Databanks International (2005) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.  
• An exchange rate dummy, which is one if the country’s exchange rate is 
classified as fixed according to the de-facto classification of exchange rate 
regimes in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), and zero otherwise. This 
variable is used to examine the impact of the exchange rate regime and is 
denoted as XRATE. 
As it is well-known that the TOR may not be a good indicator of CBI in industrial 
countries (Cukierman, 1992), we not only include the TOR in the model, but also its 
interaction with a dummy that is one if the country concerned is an OECD country and 
zero otherwise. 
 The first column of Table 3 shows the results for a panel, using the averages or 
starting values of the variables for the periods 1970-79, 1980-89 and 1990-2004.  In line 
with most previous studies, the coefficient of the TOR is positive and highly significant.  
Figure 5 shows recursive regressions of this model; the 30 countries with the lowest 
inflation are always included – additional countries are added one by one. In line with 
the findings of Sturm and De Haan (2001), the effect of the TOR only becomes 
significant if high-inflation countries are included. This suggests that the causality may 
run from inflation to turnovers rather than the other way round. Therefore, we next treat 
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the TOR as an endogenous variable using the variables that we found to be significant 
determinants of the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced as 
instruments. F-tests on the joint significance of our instruments (the average share of 
the legal term in office that has elapsed, percentage of veto players who drop, elections, 
and number of coups) in the first-stage regressions show that they are good predictors 
of turnovers, conditional on the full set of exogenous variables in the system. As the F-
tests reported in Table 3 indicate, the Staiger-Stock critical value of 10 is easily passed 
in all regressions. In all regressions, the overidentifying restrictions are also accepted at 
the five percent level of significance at least. 
 The results are shown in column (2) of Table 3. It turns out that the TOR no 
longer has a significant impact on inflation. The same conclusion is reached for the 
cross-section models shown in columns (3) – (8) of Table 3. If the TOR is used in the 
OLS regression, its coefficient is generally significantly different from zero. However, 
in the 2SLS models, the TOR never has a significant impact on inflation. 
  
Table 3. Inflation: cross-country and panel models, 1970-2004 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Instability 0.032 0.048 0.040 0.045 0.010 0.011 0.045 0.041
(2.48)** (2.53)** (2.07)** (1.56) (0.26) (0.29) (1.79)* (1.46)
Trade openness 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.74) (0.44) (1.54) (1.47) (2.29)** (1.65) (0.54) (0.63)
(log) GDP p.c. -0.127 -0.121 0.014 0.016 0.009 0.004 -0.029 -0.023
(5.25)*** (3.46)*** (1.20) (1.09) (0.51) (0.16) (2.35)** (1.15)
Fixed exchange rate, dummy -0.084 -0.089 -0.078 -0.109 -0.084 -0.074 -0.022 -0.036
(5.24)*** (4.09)*** (2.09)** (1.99)* (2.30)** (1.95)* (0.75) (0.95)
Turnover 0.155 0.220 0.077 0.161 0.293 0.314 0.239 0.017
(5.06)*** (1.24) (1.66) (1.51) (3.61)*** (1.36) (2.58)** (0.06)
Turnover, OECD -0.120 -0.855 -0.184 -1.412 0.157 -0.449 0.059 0.572
(1.71)* (0.95) (1.11) (1.23) (0.49) (0.33) (0.22) (0.31)
OECD, dummy -0.032 0.137 -0.085 0.032 -0.023 -0.124
(0.83) (0.82) (1.08) (0.11) (0.41) (0.36)
Constant 1.207 1.185 0.039 0.021 0.109 0.137 0.335 0.341
(6.08)*** (3.98)*** (0.41) (0.17) (0.78) (0.84) (3.45)*** (3.15)***
Method Fixed effects 2SLS, Fixed effects OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Observations 598 483 81 78 100 99 116 115
Number of id 118 118
R-squared 0.18 0.27 0.32 0.28
Sargan test (p-value) 0.07 0.19 0.66 0.83
First-stage F-test 29.77 12.39 13.74 25.66
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: In 2SLS, Turnover and ist interaction with the OECD dummy are instrumented with the average share of term elapsed, percentage of veto players who 
drop, elections, and number of coups.
1970-2004 1970-79 1980-89 1990-2004










6. Concluding comments 
Using a new data set on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries 
covering the period 1970-2004, we find that inflation increases the likelihood that the 
central bank governor will be replaced. This has implications for the so-called 
turnover rate of central bank governors, which is often used as an indicator of central 
bank independence (CBI). One objection that has been raised against the turnover rate  
as a proxy for CBI is that it may be endogenous to economic performance as causality 
may well run in the opposite direction. Our findings support this critique. In panel and 
cross-section models for inflation the turnover rate becomes insignificant once its 
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Appendix Table A1. A summary of the dataset on the turnover rate of central bank 
governors 
Country period # changes av. TOR Country period # changes av. TOR
Albania 1993-2005 5 0,38 Kenya 1971-2005 4 0,11
Algeria 1976-2005 6 0,20 Korea, Dem. Rep. 1971-2005 10 0,29
Argentina 1971-2005 30 0,86 Kuwait 1971-2005 3 0,09
Australia 1971-2005 4 0,11 Latvia 1992-2005 2 0,14
Austria 1971-2005 6 0,17 Lebanon 1971-2005 7 0,20
Bahamas, The 1975-2005 4 0,13 Lesotho 1979-2005 5 0,19
Bahrain 1971-2005 4 0,11 Libya 1982-1996 4 0,27
Bangladesh 1973-2005 8 0,24 Lithuania 1991-2005 3 0,20
Barbados 1973-2005 4 0,12 Luxembourg 1999-2005 1 0,14
Belgium 1971-2005 6 0,17 Madagascar 1974-2005 3 0,10
Belize 1983-2005 4 0,19 Malawi 1971-2005 7 0,20
Bermuda 1971-2005 6 0,17 Malaysia 1971-2005 5 0,14
Bhutan 1983-2005 3 0,13 Malta 1971-2005 8 0,23
Bolivia 1971-2005 21 0,70 Mauritius 1971-2005 4 0,11
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998-2005 1 0,13 Mexico 1971-2005 7 0,20
Botswana 1976-2005 7 0,23 Mongolia 1971-2005 6 0,17
Brazil 1971-2005 21 0,60 Morocco 1971-2005 3 0,09
Bulgaria 1971-2005 7 0,20 Mozambique 1976-2005 4 0,13
Burundi 1978-2005 4 0,14 Namibia 1991-2005 3 0,20
Canada 1971-2005 5 0,14 Nepal 1971-2005 7 0,20
Cape Verde 1977-1998 2 0,09 Netherlands 1971-2005 2 0,06
Central African Republic 1971-2005 3 0,09 Netherlands Antilles 1971-2005 5 0,14
Chad 1973-2005 2 0,06 New Zealand 1971-2005 5 0,14
Chile 1971-2005 15 0,43 Nicaragua 1980-1997 9 0,50
China 1971-2005 8 0,23 Nigeria 1971-2005 5 0,14
Colombia 1971-2005 5 0,14 Norway 1971-2005 5 0,14
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1973-2005 2 0,06 Pakistan 1971-2005 10 0,29
Costa Rica 1971-2005 16 0,46 Panama 1971-1988 2 0,11
Croatia 1991-2005 3 0,20 Paraguay 1971-2005 8 0,23
Cyprus 1971-2005 2 0,06 Peru 1971-1993 9 0,39
Czech Republic 1971-2005 7 0,20 Philippines 1971-2005 6 0,17
Denmark 1971-2005 5 0,14 Poland 1971-2005 11 0,31
Djibouti 1978-1998 2 0,10 Portugal 1971-2005 11 0,31
Dominican Republic 1971-2005 14 0,40 Qatar 1975-1998 1 0,10
Ecuador 1971-2005 28 0,80 Romania 1971-2005 6 0,17
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1971-2005 7 0,20 Russian Federation 1991-2005 5 0,33
El Salvador 1971-2005 13 0,37 Samoa 1985-2005 2 0,10
Equatorial Guinea 1973-2005 2 0,06 Saudi Arabia 1971-2005 2 0,06
Estonia 1991-2005 2 0,13 Serbia and Montenegro 1971-2005 10 0,29
Ethiopia 1971-2005 7 0,20 Seychelles 1979-2005 3 0,11
Fiji 1975-2005 7 0,23 Singapore 1971-2005 8 0,23
Finland 1971-2005 6 0,17 Slovak Republic 1994-2005 2 0,17
France 1971-2005 6 0,17 Slovenia 1992-2005 1 0,07
Gabon 1973-2005 2 0,06 Solomon Islands 1984-2005 1 0,05
Gambia, The 1973-1998 4 0,15 South Africa 1971-2005 3 0,09
Georgia 1978-2005 7 0,25 Spain 1971-2005 5 0,14
Germany 1971-2005 7 0,20 Sri Lanka 1971-2005 6 0,17
Ghana 1971-2005 6 0,17 Sudan 1971-2005 10 0,29
Greece 1971-2005 9 0,26 Suriname 1971-2000 4 0,13
Guatemala 1971-2005 15 0,43 Swaziland 1975-2005 4 0,13
Guinea 1977-1999 5 0,22 Sweden 1971-2005 6 0,17
Guyana 1971-2005 3 0,09 Switzerland 1971-2005 5 0,14
Haiti 1975-2005 17 0,55 Syrian Arab Republic 1975-1998 5 0,21
Honduras 1976-2005 6 0,20 Tanzania 1971-2005 4 0,11
Hungary 1971-2005 6 0,17 Thailand 1971-2005 10 0,29
Iceland 1971-2005 2 0,06 Trinidad and Tobago 1971-2005 5 0,14
India 1971-2005 11 0,31 Tunisia 1976-2005 6 0,21
Indonesia 1974-2005 5 0,16 Turkey 1971-2005 10 0,29
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1971-2005 11 0,31 Uganda 1971-2005 8 0,23
Ireland 1971-2005 5 0,14 United Kingdom 1971-2005 7 0,20
Israel 1971-2005 7 0,20 United States 1971-2005 3 0,09
Italy 1971-2005 3 0,09 Uruguay 1971-2005 14 0,40
Jamaica 1971-2005 10 0,29 Vanuatu 1981-2005 6 0,24
Japan 1971-2005 7 0,20 Venezuela, RB 1971-2005 13 0,37
Jordan 1971-2005 5 0,14 Zambia 1971-2005 9 0,26
Kazakhstan 1971-2005 8 0,23 Zimbabwe 1971-1993 4 0,17
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Appendix. Table A2. Variables used: definition and descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Governor changed, dummy 4226 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Share of term elapsed 4278 0.64 0.74 0.00 5.67
Percentage of veto players who drop 4887 0.10 0.27 0.00 1.00
Part of a year which is within 12 months after an 
executive or legislative election
6448 0.14 0.28 0.00 1.00
Coups d'etat, dummy 4916 0.03 0.17 0.00 2.00
Transformed inflation 4436 0.11 0.15 -0.28 1.00
External debt of central government scaled to 
GDP (%)
3568 68.09 87.96 0.00 1598.22
Government budget balance as % of GDP 907 2.23 8.70 -21.25 203.72
Average of 4 indicators (surrender of export 
proceeds, multiple exchange rate, capital account 
restictions, current account restrictions)
3618 0.54 0.33 0.00 1.00
New chief executive party, dummy 7488 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Change in the Polity democracy variable  > 3, 
dummy
7488 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
First principal component of various instablity 
indicators
5296 0.00 0.67 -0.52 17.84
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions scaled to GDP 
3614 0.37 0.32 0.00 1.79
Polarization*checks and balances 4805 1.21 3.14 0.00 32.00
Party of chief executive is left-wing, dummy 6863 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Depreciation of the nominal exchange rate with 
respect to the US$
5688 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.96
A country is defined as experiencing a currency 
crisis when index covering the rate of change of 
the exchange rate and international currency 
reserves is one standard deviation greater than 
the index mean
4694 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Political constraints 5076 0.31 0.34 0.00 0.89
Sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product
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